A Framework for Hybrid Systems with Denial-of-Service Security Attack by Wang, Shuling et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
63
67
v2
  [
cs
.L
O]
  2
7 M
ar 
20
14
A Framework for Hybrid Systems with
Denial-of-Service Security Attack
Shuling Wang1, Flemming Nielson2, and Hanne Riis Nielson2
1 State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software
Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
2 DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark
Abstract. Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and contin-
uous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce
safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring
and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service se-
curity attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and
as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This pa-
per proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack
in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable
behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such
a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In
the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for veri-
fying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the en-
vironments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive
theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control
system.
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1 Introduction
Hybrid systems, also known as cyber-physical systems, are dynamic systems with inter-
acting continuous-time physical systems and discrete controllers. The physical systems
evolve continuously with respect to time, such as aircrafts, or biological cell growth,
while the computer controllers, such as autopilots, or biological control circuits, moni-
tor and control the behavior of the systems to meet the given design requirements. One
design requirement is safety, which includes time-critical constraints, or invariants etc.,
for the example of train control systems, the train should arrive at the stops on time, or
the train must always move with a velocity within a safe range.
However, due to the uncertainty in the environment, the potential errors in wireless
communications between the interacting components will make the safety of the system
very hard to guarantee. For the sake of safety, when the controllers fail to behave as
expected because of absence of expected communication and thus become unreliable,
the physical systems should provide feedback control, to achieve safety despite errors
in communication.
A Motivating Example We illustrate our motivation by an example taken from train
control system, that is depicted in Fig. 1. It consists of three inter-communicating com-
ponents: Train, Driver and on board vital computer (VC). We assume that the train owns
arbitrarily long movement authority, within which the train is allowed to move only, and
must conform to a safety requirement, i.e. the velocity must be non-negative and cannot
exceed a maximum limit. The train acts as a continuous plant, and moves with a given
acceleration; both the driver and the VC act as controllers, in such a way that, either
of them observes the velocity of the train periodically, and then according to the safety
requirement, computes the new acceleration for the train to follow in the next period.
According to the specification of the system, the message from the VC always takes
high priority over the one from the driver.
Train
Driver VC
trd dr vc trv
Fig. 1. The structure of train control example
However, the expected monitoring and control from VC or driver may fail due to
denial-of-service security attack, e.g. if the driver falls asleep, or if the VC gets mal-
function, and as a consequence, the train may get no response from any of them within
a duration of time. The safety requirement of the train will then be violated very easily.
This poses the problem of how to build a safe hybrid system in the presence of this sort
of denial-of-service security attack from the environment.
The contribution of this paper includes the following aspects:
– a programming notation, for formally modeling hybrid systems and meanwhile
being able to express denial-of-service due to unreliable communications, and an
assertion language, for describing safety as annotations in such programs;
– a deductive inference system, for reasoning about whether the program satisfies the
annotated safety property, and a subsequent interactive theorem prover.
As a direct application, we are able to build a safe system for the example such that:
(F1) the error configurations where neither driver nor VC is available are not reachable;
(F2) the velocity of the train keeps always in the safe range, although in the presence of
denial-of-service attack from the driver or the VC.
Furthermore, when the behavior of the environments (i.e. driver and VC) is determined,
e.g. by defining some constraints among the constants of the whole system, we can
learn more precise behavior of the train.
In Section 2 and Section 3, we present the syntax and semantics for the formal
modeling language. It is a combination of Hybrid CSP (HCSP) [5,19], a process algebra
based modeling language for describing hybrid systems, and the binders from Quality
Calculus [13], a process calculus that allows one to take measures in case of unreliable
communications. With the introducing of binders, the modelling language is capable of
programming a safe system that executes in an open environment that does not always
live up to expectations.
In Section 4, we define an inference system for reasoning about HCSP with binders.
For each construct P , the specification is of the form {ϕ} P {ψ,HF}, where ϕ and ψ
are the pre-/post-condition recording the initial and terminating states of P respectively,
and HF the history formula recording the whole execution history of P (thus able to
specify global invariants). As a direct application, the (un-)reachability analysis can be
performed by identifying the points corresponding to the error configurations by logical
formulas and then checking the (un-)satisfiability of the formulas. In Section 5, we have
applied a theorem prover we have implemented to verify properties (F1) and (F2) of the
train control example. At last, we conclude the paper and address some future work.
Related Work There have been numerous work on formal modeling and verifica-
tion of hybrid systems, e.g., [1,11,6,10,7], the most popular of which is hybrid au-
tomata [1,11,6]. For automata-based approaches, the verification of hybrid systems is
reduced to computing reachable sets, which is conducted either by model-checking [1]
or by the decision procedure of Tarski algebra [7]. However, hybrid automata, analo-
gous to state machines, has little support for structured description; and meanwhile, the
verification of it based on reachability computation is not scalable and only applicable
to some specific linear hybrid systems, as it heavily depends on the decidability of the
problems to be solved. Applying abstraction or (numeric) approximation [4,2,3] can
improve the scalability, but as a pay we have to sacrifice the precision.
In contrast, deductive methods increasingly attract more attention in the verification
of hybrid systems as it can scale up to complex systems. A differential-algebraic dy-
namic logic for hybrid programs [14] was proposed by extending dynamic logic with
continuous statements, and has been applied for safety checking of European Train
Control System [15]. However, the hybrid programs there can be considered as a tex-
tual encoding of hybrid automata, with no support for communication and concurrency.
In [8,16], the Hoare logic is extended to hybrid systems modeled by Hybrid CSP [5,19],
and then used for safety checking of Chinese Train Control System. But the logic lacks
compositionality.
All the work mentioned above focus on safety without considering denial-of-service
security attacks from the environment. Quality Calculus [13,12] for the first time pro-
posed a programming notation for expressing denial-of-service in communication sys-
tems, but is currently limited to discrete time world.
2 Syntax
We first choose Hybrid CSP (HCSP) [5,19] as the modelling language for hybrid sys-
tems. HCSP inherits from CSP the explicit communication model and concurrency,
thus is expressive enough for describing distributed components and the interactions
between them. Moreover, it extends CSP with differential equations for representing
continuous evolution, and provides several forms of interrupts to continuous evolution
for realizing communication-based discrete control. On the other hand, Quality Calcu-
lus [13,12] is recently proposed to programming software components and their interac-
tions in the presence of unreliable communications. With the help of binders specifying
the success or failure of communications and then the communications to be performed
before continuing, it becomes natural in Quality Calculus to plan for reasonable be-
havior in case the ideal behavior fails due to unreliable communication and thereby to
increase the quality of the system.
In our approach, we will extend HCSP further with the notion of binders from Qual-
ity Calculus, for modelling hybrid systems in the presence of denial-of-service because
of unreliable communications. The overall modelling language is given by the follow-
ing syntax:
e ::= c | x | fk(e1, ..., ek)
b ::= ch!e{u1} | ch?x{u2} | &q(b1, · · · , bn)
P,Q ::= skip | x := e | b | 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 | 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b→ Q |
P‖Q | P ;Q | ω → P | P ∗
Expressions e are used to construct data elements and consist of constants c, data
variables x, and function application fk(e1, ..., ek).
Binders b specify the inputs and outputs to be performed before continuing. The out-
put ch!e{u1} expects to send message e along channel ch, with u1 being the acknowl-
edgement in case the communication succeeds, and the dual input ch?x{u2} expects
to receive a message from ch and assigns it to variable x, with u2 being the acknowl-
edgement similarly. We call both u1 and u2 acknowledgment variables, and assume in
syntax that for each input or output statement, there exists a unique acknowledgement
variable attached to it. In the sequel, we will use V and A to represent the set of data
variables and acknowledgement variables respectively, and they are disjoint. For the
general form &q(b1, · · · , bn), the quality predicate q specifies the sufficient communi-
cations among b1, · · · , bn for the following process to proceed. In syntax, q is a logical
combination of quality predicates corresponding to b1, · · · , bn recursively (denoted by
q1, · · · , qn respectively below). For example, the quality predicates for ch!e{u1} and
ch?x{u2} are boolean formulas u1 = 1 and u2 = 1. There are two special forms of
quality predicates, abbreviated as ∃ and ∀, with the definitions: ∀ def= q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qn and
∃
def
= q1 ∨ · · · ∨ qn. More forms of quality predicates can be found in [13].
Example 1. For the train example, define binder b0 as &∃(dr?xa{ua}, vc?ya{wa}), the
quality predicate of which amounts to ua = 1 ∨ wa = 1. It expresses that, the train is
waiting for the acceleration from the driver and the VC, via dr and vc respectively,
and as soon as one of the communications succeeds (i.e., when the quality predicate
becomes true), the following process will be continued without waiting for the other. ⊓⊔
P,Q define processes. The skip and assignment x := e are defined as usual, tak-
ing no time to complete. Binders b are explained above. The continuous evolution
〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, where s represents a vector of continuous variables and s˙ the corre-
sponding first-order derivative of s, forces s to evolve according to the differential equa-
tionsF as long as B, a boolean formula of s that defines the domain of s, holds, and ter-
minates when B turns false. The communication interrupt 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b→ Q
behaves as 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 first, and if b occurs before the continuous terminates, the
continuous will be preempted and Q will be executed instead.
The rest of the constructs define compound processes. The parallel composition
P‖Q behaves as if P and Q run independently except that the communications along
the common channels connecting P and Q are to be synchronized. In syntax, P and
Q in parallel are restricted not to share variables, nor input or output channels. The se-
quential composition P ;Q behaves as P first, and if it terminates, as Q afterwards. The
conditional ω → P behaves as P if ω is true, otherwise terminates immediately. The
condition ω can be used for checking the status of data variables or acknowledgement,
thus in syntax, it is a boolean formula on data and acknowledgement variables (while
for the above continuous evolution,B is a boolean formula on only data variables). The
repetition P ∗ executes P for arbitrarily finite number of times.
It should be noticed that, with the addition of binders, it is able to derive a number
of other known constructs of process calculi, e.g., internal and external choice [13].
Example 2. Following Example 1, the following model
t := 0; 1〈s˙ = v, v˙ = a, t˙ = 1&t < T 〉☎ b0
2 →
(wa = 1
3 → a := ya;wa = 0 ∧ ua = 1
4 → a := xa; wa = 0 ∧ ua = 0
5 → skip)
denoted by P0, expresses that, the train moves with velocity v and acceleration a, and
as soon as b0 occurs within T time units, i.e. the train succeeds to receive a new accel-
eration from either the driver or the VC, then its acceleration a will be updated by case
analysis. It can be seen that the acceleration from VC will be used in priority. For later
reference we have annotated the program with labels (e.g. 1, 2, etc.). ⊓⊔
3 Transition Semantics
We first introduce a variable now to record the global time during process execution,
and then define the set V+ = V∪A∪{now}. A state, ranging over σ, σ′, assigns a value
to each variable in V+, and we will use Σ to represent the set of states. A flow, ranging
over h, h′, defined on a closed time interval [r1, r2] with 0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2, or an infinite
interval [r,∞) with some r ≥ 0, assigns a state in Σ to each point in the interval. Given
a state σ, an expression e is evaluated to a value under σ, denoted by σ(e) below.
Each transition relation has the form (P, σ) α−→ (P ′, σ′, h), where P is a process,
σ, σ′ are states, h is a flow, and α is an event. It represents that starting from initial state
σ, P evolves into P ′ and ends with state σ′ and flow h, while performing event α. When
the above transition takes no time, it produces a point flow, i.e. σ(now) = σ′(now) and
h = {σ(now) 7→ σ′}, and we will call the transition discrete and write (P, σ) α−→
(P ′, σ′) instead without losing any information. The label α represents events, which
can be a discrete internal event, like skip, assignment, evaluation of boolean conditions,
or termination of a continuous evolution etc., uniformly denoted by τ , or an external
communication, like output ch!c{1} or input ch?c{1}, or an internal communication
ch†c{1}, or a time delay d for some positive d. We call the events but the time delay
discrete events, and will use β to range over them.
(ch?x{u}, σ)
ch?c{1}
−−−−−→ (ǫ, σ[x 7→ c, u 7→ 1])
(ch?x{u}, σ)
d
−→ (ch?x{u}, σ[now + d], hd)
(ch!e{u}, σ)
ch!σ(e){1}
−−−−−−−→ (ǫ, σ[u 7→ 1]) (ch!e{u}, σ)
d
−→ (ch!e{u}, σ[now + d], hd)
[[q]](b1, · · · , bn) = q[(b1 ≡ ǫ)/q1, · · · , (bn ≡ ǫ)/qn]
〈|()|〉σ = σ 〈|(ǫ, b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ = 〈|(b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ
〈|(ch?x{u}, b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ = 〈|(b2, · · · , bn)|〉(σ[u 7→ 0])
〈|(ch!e{u}, b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ = 〈|(b2, · · · , bn)|〉(σ[u 7→ 0])
〈|(&qk(bk1, · · · , bkm), b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ = 〈|(bk1, · · · , bkm, b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ
[[q]](b1, · · · , bn) = false
(&q(b1, · · · , bn), σ)
d
−→ (&q(b1, · · · , bn), σ[now + d], hd)
(bi, σ)
β
−→ (b′i, σ
′)
(&q(b1, · · · , bi, · · · , bn), σ)
β
−→ (&q(b1, · · · , b
′
i, · · · , bn), σ
′)
[[q]](b1, · · · , bn) = true 〈|(b1, · · · , bn)|〉σ = σ
′
(&q(b1, · · · , bn), σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ′)
Table 1. The transition relations for binders and the auxiliary functions
The transition relations for binders are defined in Table 1. The input ch?x{u}
may perform an external communication ch?c{1}, and as a result x will be bound
to c and u set to 1, or it may keep waiting for d time. For the second case, a flow
hd over [σ(now), σ(now) + d] is produced, satisfying that for any t in the domain,
hd(t) = σ[now 7→ t], i.e. no variable but the clock now in V+ is changed during the
waiting period. Similarly, there are two rules for output ch!e{u}. Here σ[now + d] is
an abbreviation for σ[now 7→ σ(now) + d].
Before defining the semantics of general binders, we introduce two auxiliary func-
tions. Assume (b1, · · · , bn) is an intermediate tuple of binders that occurs during execu-
tion (thus some of bis might contain ǫ), q a quality predicate, and σ a state. The function
[[q]](b1, · · · , bn) defines the truth value of q under (b1, · · · , bn), which is calculated by
replacing each sub-predicate qi corresponding to bi in q by bi ≡ ǫ respectively; and
function 〈|(b1, b2, · · · , bn)|〉σ returns a state that fully reflects the failure or success of
binders b1, · · · , bn, and can be constructed from σ by setting the acknowledgement vari-
ables corresponding to the failing inputs or outputs among b1, · · · , bn to be 0. Based on
these definitions, binder &q(b1, · · · , bn) may keep waiting for d time, if q is false under
(b1, · · · , bn), or perform a discrete event β that is enabled for some bi, or perform a
τ transition and terminate if q is true under (b1, · · · , bn). Notice that when q becomes
true, the enabled discrete events can still be performed, as indicated by the second rule.
Example 3. Starting from σ0, the execution of b0 in Example 1 may lead to three pos-
sible states at termination:
– σ0[now + d, xa 7→ ca, ua 7→ 1, wa 7→ 0], indicating that the train succeeds to
receive ca from the driver after d time units have passed, but fails for the VC;
– σ0[now + d, ya 7→ da, wa 7→ 1, ua 7→ 0], for the opposite case of the first;
– σ0[now + d, xa 7→ ca, ua 7→ 1, ya 7→ da, wa 7→ 1], indicating that the train
succeeds to receive messages from the driver as well as the VC after d time. ⊓⊔
The transition relations for other processes are defined in Table 2. The rules for
skip and assignment can be defined as usual. The idle rule represents that the process
can stay at the terminating state ǫ for arbitrary d time units, with nothing changed but
only the clock progress. For continuous evolution, for any d > 0, it evolves for d time
units according to F if B evaluates to true within this period (the right end exclusive).
A flow hd,s over [σ(now), σ(now) + d] will then be produced, such that for any o in
the domain, hd,s(o) = σ[now 7→ o, s 7→ S(o − σ(now))], where S(t) is the solution
as defined in the rule. Otherwise, the continuous evolution terminates at a point if B
evaluates to false at the point, or if B evaluates to false at a positive open interval right
to the point.
For communication interrupt, the process may evolve for d time units if both the
continuous evolution and the binder can progress for d time units, and then reach the
same state and flow as the continuous evolution does. It may perform a discrete event
over b, and if the resulting binder b′ is not ǫ, then the continuous evolution is kept, oth-
erwise, the continuous evolution will be interrupted and Q will be followed to execute,
and for both cases, will reach the same state and flow as the binder does. Finally, it may
perform a τ event and terminate immediately if the continuous evolution terminates
with a τ event but b not. Notice that the final state σ′′ needs to be reconstructed from σ′
by resetting the acknowledgement variables of those unsuccessful binders occurring in
b to be 0.
Before defining the semantics of parallel composition, we need to introduce some
notations. Two states σ1 and σ2 are disjoint, iff dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) = {now} and
σ1(now) = σ2(now). For two disjoint states σ1 and σ2, σ1 ⊎ σ2 is defined as a state
over dom(σ1)∪dom(σ2), satisfying that σ1⊎σ2(v) is σ1(v) if v ∈ dom(σ1), otherwise
σ2(v) if v ∈ dom(σ2). We lift this definition to flows h1 and h2 satisfying dom(h1) =
dom(h2), and define h1 ⊎ h2 to be a flow such that h1 ⊎ h2(t) = h1(t) ⊎ h2(t). For
P‖Q, assume σ1 and σ2 represent the initial states for P and Q respectively and are
disjoint. The process will perform a communication along a common channel of P and
Q, if P and Q get ready to synchronize with each other along the channel. Otherwise,
it will perform a discrete event, that can be τ , an internal communication of P , or
an external communication along some non-common channel of P and Q, if P can
progress separately on this event (and the symmetric rule for Q is left out here). When
neither internal communication nor τ event is enabled for P ||Q, it may evolve for d
time units if both P and Q can evolve for d time units. Finally, the process will perform
a τ event and terminate as soon as both the components terminate.
At last, the rules for conditional, sequential, and repetition are defined as usual.
Example 4. Starting from state σ0, the execution of P0 in Example 2 leads to the fol-
lowing cases (let v0 denote σ0(v) below):
Skip, Assignment and Idle (skip, σ) τ−→ (ǫ, σ)
(x := e, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ[x 7→ σ(e)]) (ǫ, σ)
d
−→ (ǫ, σ[now + d], hd)
Continuous Evolution For any d > 0,
S(t) is a solution of F(s˙, s) = 0 over [0, d] satisfying that S(0) = σ(s)
and ∀t ∈ [0, d).hd,s(t+ σ(now))(B) = true
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ)
d
−→ (〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ[now + d, s 7→ S(d)], hd,s)
(σ(B) = false) or (σ(B) = true ∧ ∃δ > 0.
(S(t) is a solution of F(s˙, s) = 0 over [0, δ] satisfying that S(0) = σ(s)
and ∀t ∈ (0, δ).hδ,s(t+ σ(now))(B) = false))
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ)
Communication Interrupt
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ)
d
−→ (〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ′, h) (b, σ)
d
−→ (b, σ′′, h′′)
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b→ Q,σ)
d
−→ (〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b → Q,σ′, h)
(b, σ)
β
−→ (b′, σ′) b′ 6= ǫ
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b → Q,σ)
β
−→ (〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b′ → Q,σ′)
(b, σ)
β
−→ (ǫ, σ′)
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b→ Q,σ)
β
−→ (Q,σ′)
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ′) ¬((b, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ,−))
b ≡ &q(b1, · · · , bn) 〈|(b1, · · · , bn)|〉σ
′ = σ′′
(〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b→ Q,σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ′′)
Parallel Composition
(P, σ1)
ch?c{1}
−−−−−→ (P ′, σ′1) (Q,σ2)
ch!c{1}
−−−−−→ (Q′, σ′2)
(P ‖ Q,σ1 ⊎ σ2)
ch†c{1}
−−−−−→ (P ′||Q′, σ′1 ⊎ σ
′
2)
(P, σ1)
β
−→ (P ′, σ′1) β ∈ {τ, ch†c{1}, ch?c{1}, ch!c{1} |
ch /∈ Chan(P ) ∩ Chan(Q)} ∀ch, c.(¬((P, σ1)
ch?c{1}
−−−−−→ ∧(Q,σ2)
ch!c{1}
−−−−−→)
∧¬((P, σ1)
ch!c{1}
−−−−−→ ∧(Q,σ2)
ch?c{1}
−−−−−→))
(P ‖ Q,σ1 ⊎ σ2)
β
−→ (P ′||Q,σ′1 ⊎ σ2)
(P, σ1)
d
−→ (P ′, σ′1, h1) (Q,σ2)
d
−→ (Q′, σ′2, h2)
∀ch, c.¬((P ‖ Q,σ1 ⊎ σ2)
ch†c{1}
−−−−−→) ¬((P ‖ Q,σ1 ⊎ σ2)
τ
−→)
(P ‖ Q,σ1 ⊎ σ2)
d
−→ (P ′||Q′, σ′1 ⊎ σ
′
2, h1 ⊎ h2)
(ǫ‖ǫ, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ)
Other Compound Constructs
σ(ω) = true
(ω → P, σ)
τ
−→ (P, σ)
σ(ω) = false
(ω → P, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ)
(P, σ)
α
−→ (P ′, σ′, h) P ′ 6= ǫ
(P ;Q,σ)
α
−→ (P ′;Q,σ′, h)
(P, σ)
α
−→ (ǫ, σ′, h)
(P ;Q,σ)
α
−→ (Q,σ′, h)
(P, σ)
α
−→ (P ′, σ′, h) P ′ 6= ǫ
(P ∗, σ)
α
−→ (P ′;P ∗, σ′, h)
(P, σ)
α
−→ (ǫ, σ′, h)
(P ∗, σ)
α
−→ (P ∗, σ′, h)
(P ∗, σ)
τ
−→ (ǫ, σ)
Table 2. The transition relations for processes
– P0 terminates without the occurrence of b0, the final state is σ0[now+T, t+T, v+
aT, s+ v0T + 0.5aT
2, ua 7→ 0, wa 7→ 0];
– b0 occurs after d time units for some d ≤ T , and as a result P0 executes to location
2, with state σ0[now + d, t + d, v + ad, s + v0d + 0.5ad2, ua, wa, xa, ya], where
ua, wa, xa and ya have 3 possible evaluations as defined in Example 3, and then
depending on the values of ua and wa, executes to location 3 or 4 respectively, and
finally terminates after a corresponding acceleration update. ⊓⊔
Flow of a Process Given two flows h1 and h2 defined on [r1, r2] and [r2, r3] (or
[r2,∞)) respectively, we define the concatenation ha1 h2 as the flow defined on [r1, r3]
(or [r1,∞)) such that ha1 h2(t) is equal to h1(t) if t ∈ [r1, r2), otherwise h2(t). Given
a process P and an initial state σ, if we have the following sequence of transitions:
(P, σ)
α0−→ (P1, σ1, h1) (P1, σ1)
α1−→ (P2, σ2, h2)
. . . (Pn−1, σn−1)
αn−1
−−−→ (Pn, σn, hn)
then we define ha1 . . .a hn as the flow from P to Pn with respect to the initial state σ,
and furthermore, write (P, σ) α0···αn−1−−−−−−→ (Pn, σn, ha1 . . .a hn) to represent the whole
transition sequence (and for simplicity, the label sequence can be omitted sometimes).
When Pn is ǫ, we call ha1 . . .a hn a complete flow of P with respect to σ.
4 Inference System
In this section, we define an inference system for reasoning about both discrete and
continuous properties of HCSP with binders, which are considered for an isolated time
point and a time interval respectively.
History Formulas In order to describe the interval-related properties, we introduce
history formulas, that are defined by duration calculus (DC) [18,17]. DC is a first-order
interval-based real-time logic with one binary modality known as chop a. History for-
mulas HF are defined by the following subset of DC:
HF ::= ℓ ◦ T | ⌈S⌉ | HF1
aHF2 | ¬HF | HF1 ∨HF2
where ℓ is a temporal variable denoting the length of the considered interval, ◦ ∈ {<
,=} is a relation, T a non-negative real, and S a first-order state formula over process
variables. For simplicity, we will write ⌈S⌉< as an abbreviation for ⌈S⌉ ∨ ℓ = 0.
HF can be interpreted over flows and intervals. We define the judgement h, [a, b] |=
HF to represent that HF holds under h and [a, b], then we have
h, [a, b] |= ℓ ◦ T iff (b − a) ◦ T h, [a, b] |= ⌈S⌉ iff
∫ b
a
h(t)(S) = b− a
h, [a, b] |= HF1
aHF2 iff ∃c.a ≤ c ≤ b ∧ h, [a, c] |= HF1 ∧ h, [c, b] |= HF2
As defined above, ℓ indicates the length of the considered interval; ⌈S⌉ asserts that
S holds almost everywhere in the considered interval; and HF⌢1 HF2 asserts that the
interval can be divided into two sub-intervals such that HF1 holds for the first and HF2
for the second. The first-order connectives ¬ and ∨ can be explained as usual.
All axioms and inference rules for DC presented in [17] can be applied here, such
as
True ⇔ ℓ ≥ 0 ⌈S⌉a⌈S⌉ ⇔ ⌈S⌉ HFaℓ = 0⇔ HF
⌈S1⌉ ⇒ ⌈S2⌉ if S1 ⇒ S2 is valid in FOL
Specification The specification for process P takes form {ϕ} P {ψ,HF}, where the
pre-/post-condition ϕ and ψ, defined by FOL, specify properties of variables that hold
at the beginning and termination of the execution of P respectively, and the history for-
mula HF , specifies properties of variables that hold throughout the execution interval
of P . The specification of P is defined with no dependence on the behavior of its envi-
ronment. The specification is valid, denoted by |= {ϕ} P {ψ,HF}, iff for any state σ,
if (P, σ) −→ (ǫ, σ′, h), then σ |= ϕ implies σ′ |= ψ and h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= HF .
Acknowledgement of Binders In order to define the inference rules for binders b,
we first define an auxiliary typing judgement ⊢ b ◮ ϕ, where the first-order formula ϕ
describes the acknowledgement corresponding to successful passing of b, and is defined
without dependence on the precondition of b. We say b ◮ ϕ valid, denoted by |= b ◮ ϕ,
iff given any state σ, if (b, σ) −→ (ǫ, σ′, h), then σ′ |= ϕ holds.
The typing judgement for binders is defined as follows:
⊢ ch?x{u} ◮ u = 1 ⊢ ch!e{u} ◮ u = 1
⊢ b1 ◮ ϕ1, · · · , ⊢ bn ◮ ϕn
⊢ &q(b1, · · · , bn) ◮ [{q}](ϕ1, · · · , ϕn)
As indicated above, for input ch?x{u}, the successful passing of it gives rise to formula
u = 1, and similarly for output ch!e{u}; for binder &q(b1, · · · , bn), it gives rise to
formula [{q}](ϕ1, · · · , ϕn), which encodes the effect of quality predicate q to the sub-
formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn corresponding to b1, . . . , bn respectively.
Example 5. For binder b0 in Example 1, we have ⊢ b0 ◮ ua = 1 ∨ wa = 1, indicating
that, if the location after b0 is reachable, then at least one of the communications with
the driver or the VC succeeds. ⊓⊔
4.1 Inference Rules
We first introduce an auxiliary function mv(b), which given a binder b, returns the
variables that may be modified by b. It can be defined directly by structural induction
on b and we omit the details. The inference rules for deducing the specifications of all
constructs are presented in Table 3.
Statements skip and assignment are defined as in classical Hoare Logic, plus ℓ = 0
in the history formula, indicating that they both take zero time to complete. For each
form of the binders b, the postcondition is the conjunction of the quantified precondition
ϕ over variables in mv(b) and the acknowledgement corresponding to the successful
passing of b. The binders may occur without waiting any time, indicated by ℓ = 0 as
one disjunctive clause of each history formula. For both ch?x{u} and ch!e{u}, if the
waiting time is greater than 0, thenϕ will hold almost everywhere in the waiting interval
{ϕ} skip {ϕ, ℓ = 0} {ψ[e/x]} x := e {ψ, ℓ = 0}
{ϕ} ch?x{u} {(∃x, u.ϕ) ∧ u = 1, ⌈ϕ⌉<} {ϕ} ch!e{u} {(∃u.ϕ) ∧ u = 1, ⌈ϕ⌉<}
⊢ &q(b1, · · · , bn) ◮ α
{ϕ} &q(b1, · · · , bn) { (∃mv(&q(b1, · · · , bn)).ϕ) ∧ α, ⌈∃mv(&q(b1, · · · , bn)).ϕ⌉
< }
{ϕ} 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 { (∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(¬B) ∧ cl(Inv), ⌈(∃s.ϕ) ∧B ∧ Inv⌉< }
⊢ &q(b1, · · · , bn) ◮ α {(∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(Inv)) ∧ α} Q {ψ1, h1}
{ϕ}〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉☎ b → Q
{(∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ)∧ cl(¬B) ∧ cl(Inv)) ∨ ψ1,
⌈∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ)∧B ∧ Inv⌉<a(ℓ = 0 ∨ h1)}
{ϕ} P {ψ1, h1} {ϕ} Q {ψ2, h2}
{ϕ} P‖Q {ψ1 ∧ ψ2, ((h
a
1 True) ∧ h2) ∨ (h1 ∧ (h
a
2 True))}
{ϕ} P {ψ1, h1} {ψ1} Q {ψ2, h2}
{ϕ} P ;Q {ψ2, h
a
1 h2}
{ϕ ∧ ω} P {ψ1, h1}
{ϕ} ω → P {(ϕ ∧ ¬ω) ∨ ψ1, ℓ = 0 ∨ h1}
{ϕ} P {ϕ, Inv} InvaInv ⇒ Inv
{ϕ} P ∗ {ϕ, Inv ∨ ℓ = 0}
Table 3. An inference system for processes
(the only possible exception is the right endpoint, at which the communication occurs
and variables might be changed correspondingly). For &q(b1, · · · , bn), only the quan-
tified ϕ over variables in mv(b) is guaranteed to hold almost everywhere throughout
the waiting interval, since some binders bis that make q true might occur at sometime
during the interval and as a consequence variables in ϕ might get changed.
For continuous evolution, the notion of differential invariants is used instead of ex-
plicit solutions. A differential invariant of 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 for given initial values of
s is a first-order formula of s, which is satisfied by the initial values and also by all the
values reachable by the trajectory of s defined by F within the domain B. A method
on generating differential invariants for polynomial differential equations was proposed
in [9]. Here we assume Inv is a differential invariant with respect to precondition ϕ
for the continuous evolution (more details on using Inv are shown in the later exam-
ple proof). For the postcondition, the quantified ϕ over the only modified variables s,
the closure of ¬B, and the closure of Inv hold. The closure cl(·) extends the domain
defined by the corresponding formula to include the boundary. For the history formula,
the execution interval may be 0, or otherwise, the quantified ϕ over s, B and Inv holds
almost everywhere throughout the interval.
For communication interrupt, if b fails to occur before the continuous evolution
terminates, the effect of the whole statement is almost equivalent to the continuous evo-
lution, except that some variables in b may get changed because of occurrences of some
communications during the execution of the continuous evolution. Otherwise, if b suc-
ceeds within the termination of the continuous evolution, the continuous evolution will
be interrupted and Q will start to execute from the interrupting point. At the interrupt-
ing point, the acknowledgement of b holds, and moreover, because s and variables in
mv(b) may have been modified, ∃mv(b).((∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(Inv)) holds (the closure here is
to include the case when the interrupting point is exactly the termination point of the
continuous evolution). For the second case, the postcondition is defined as the one for
Q, and the history formula as the chop of the one for the continuous evolution before
interruption and the one for Q afterwards. Finally, as indicated by the rule, the postcon-
dition and history formula for the whole statement are defined as the disjunction of the
above two cases.
The rule for P‖Q is defined by conjunction, however, because P and Q may ter-
minate at different time, the formula True is added to the end of the history formula
with short time interval to make the two intervals equal. For P ;Q, the history formula
is defined by the concatenation of the ones of P and Q. The rule for ω → P includes
two cases depending on whether ω holds or not. At last, for P ∗, we need to find the
invariants, i.e. ϕ and Inv, for both the postcondition and history formula.
The general inference rules that are applicable to all constructs, like monotonicity,
case analysis etc., can be defined as usual and are omitted here.
We have proved the following soundness theorem:
Theorem 1. Given a process P , if {ϕ} P {ψ,HF} can be deduced from the inference
rules, then |= {ϕ} P {ψ,HF}.
PROOF. We need to prove that, for any state σ, if (P, σ) −→ (ǫ, σ′, h), then σ |= ϕ
implies σ′ |= ψ and h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= HF . The proof is given by structural
induction on P as follows.
– The proof for skip and x := e is trivial.
– Cases binders b: For b ≡ ch?x{u}, according to the transition system, there exist
some d ≥ 0 and c such that σ′ = σ[σ(now) 7→ σ(now) + d][x 7→ c, u 7→ 1] and
h defined on [σ(now), σ(now) + d] satisfies that h(t) = σ[now 7→ t] for each t in
[σ(now), σ(now)+d) and h(σ(now)+d) = σ′. Thus, from σ |= ϕ, σ′ |= ∃x, u.ϕ
and h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= ⌈ϕ⌉< must hold (notice that now does not occur in
assertions). The case for b ≡ ch!e{u} can be proved similarly.
For b ≡ &q(b1, · · · , bn), according to the transition system, there must exist some
d ≥ 0 such that σ′(now) = σ(now) + d, and for each bi evolving to ǫ at ter-
mination, there must be σ′(ui) = 1, and for any variable x that is not mv(b),
for any t ∈ [σ(now), σ(now′)], h(t)(x) = σ(x). Thus σ′ |= ∃mv(b).ϕ and
h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= ⌈∃mv(b).ϕ⌉< hold. And, from [[q]](b′1, · · · , b′n) = true,
where b′1, · · · , b′n represent the final form of b1, · · · , bn during the execution of b,
we have σ′ |= α proved.
– Case 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉: According to the transition system, there must exist d ≥ 0
such that σ′ = σ[now 7→ σ(now) + d, s 7→ S(d)] and h defined over [σ(now),
σ(now)+d] satisfies that for any o in the domain, h(o) = σ[now 7→ o, s 7→ S(o−
σ(now))], where S is the solution of the continuous with respect to σ(s) as defined
in the rule. Moreover, for any o ∈ [σ(now), σ(now)+d), h(o) |= B, and σ′ |= ¬B
or there exists δ > 0 such that for any o ∈ (σ′(now), σ′(now) + δ), σ′[now 7→
o, s 7→ S′(o − σ′(now))] |= ¬B, where S′ is the solution of the continuous with
respect to σ′(s) as defined in the rule. Obviously, σ′ |= (∃s.ϕ)∧cl(¬B). According
to the definition of Inv, then for any o ∈ [σ(now), σ(now) + d), h(o) |= Inv,
thus σ′ |= cl(Inv) and h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= ⌈Inv⌉< hold. Plus the fact that
h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |= ⌈(∃s.ϕ) ∧B⌉<, the result is proved.
– Case 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 ☎ b → Q: According to the transition system, there are
two cases for termination, by applying the fourth and the third transition rules for it
respectively. For the first case, there must exist d such that σ′(now) = σ(now)+d,
and for any variable x except for s and the ones in mv(b), σ′(x) = σ(x) and for
any o ∈ [σ(now), σ(now)+d], h(o)(x) = σ(x). Plus the semantics of continuous,
we have σ′ |= ∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(¬B) ∧ cl(Inv) and h, [σ(now), σ′(now)] |=
⌈∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ)∧B∧Inv⌉< proved. For the second case, there must exist d1 such
that σ′′(now) = σ(now) + d1, and for any variable x except for s and the ones in
mv(b), σ′′(x) = σ(x) and for any o ∈ [σ(now), σ(now) + d], h′(o)(x) = σ(x),
and σ′′ |= (∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(Inv)) ∧ α, and (Q, σ′′) → (ǫ, σ′, h′′), and h =
h′ah′′. The fact is proved based on the inductive hypothesis on Q.
– Cases P‖Q, P ;Q and ω → P : According to the transition system, for P‖Q, sup-
pose P and Q terminate at the same time, then there must exist σ1, h1, and σ2, h2
such that (P, σ) → (ǫ, σ1, h1), (Q, σ) → (ǫ, σ2, h2), σ′ = σ1⊎σ2 and h = h1⊎h2.
The fact is proved by induction hypothesis on P and Q. The other cases can be
proved easily.
Similarly, the rules for P ;Q and ω → P can be proved by induction hypothesis,
and we omit the details here.
– Case P ∗: According to the transition system, we have
σ′ = σ h = {σ(now) 7→ σ′}
or there exist an integer k > 0 such that σk = σ′, h = h1ah2a · · ·ahk, and a
sequence of transitions as follows:
(P, σ) → (ǫ, σ1, h1)
(P, σ1)→ (ǫ, σ2, h2)
· · ·
(P, σk−1) → (ǫ, σk, hk)
For the first case, the fact holds trivially. For the second case, suppose the fact holds
when k < n for some n > 0, next we prove that the fact holds for k = n. According
to the transition rule, we have
(P, σn−1)→ (ǫ, σn, hn), σn−1 |= ϕ
h1
a · · ·ahn−1, [σ(now), σn−1(now)] |= Inv ∨ ℓ = 0
By induction hypothesis on P , σn |= ϕ and hn, [σn−1(now), σn(now)] |= Inv
must hold. Then h1a · · ·ahn, [σ(now), σn(now)] |= (Inv ∨ ℓ = 0)aInv, plus
InvaInv ⇒ Inv, we have h1a · · ·ahn, [σ(now), σn(now)] |= Inv proved.
⊓⊔
4.2 Application: Reachability Analysis
The inference system can be applied directly for reachability analysis. Given a labelled
process S (a process annotated with integers denoting locations), a precondition ϕ and
a location l in S, by applying the inference system, we can deduce a property ψ such
that if S reaches l, ψ must hold at l, denoted by ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ. In another word, If
⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ and ψ is not satisfiable, then l will not be reachable in S with respect to
ϕ. We have the following facts based on the structural induction of S:
– for any process P , ⊢ lP, l, ϕ ◮ ϕ and ⊢ P l, l, ϕ ◮ ψ provided {ϕ} P {ψ,−};
– ⊢ 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 ☎ lb → S′, l, ϕ ◮ ϕ. ⊢ 〈F(s˙, s) = 0&B〉 ☎ bl → S′, l, ϕ ◮
(∃mv(b).(∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(Inv)) ∧ α (denoted by ϕ′), if ⊢ b ◮ α holds. ⊢ 〈F(s˙, s) =
0&B〉☎ b→ S′, l, ϕ ◮ ψ if l ∈ S′ and ⊢ S′, l, ϕ′ ◮ ψ hold;
– ⊢ S1;S2, l, ϕ ◮ ψ if l ∈ S1 and ⊢ S1, l, ϕ ◮ ψ hold. ⊢ S1;S2, l, ϕ ◮ ψ′ if l ∈ S2,
{ϕ} S1 {ψ,−} and ⊢ S2, l, ψ ◮ ψ′ hold;
– ⊢ ωl → S′, l, ϕ ◮ ϕ ∧ ω. ⊢ ω → S′, l, ϕ ◮ ψ if l ∈ S′ and ⊢ S′, l, ϕ ∧ ω ◮ ψ;
– ⊢ S′∗, l, ϕ ◮ ψ, if l ∈ S′, ⊢ S′, l, ϕ ◮ ψ and {ϕ} S′ {ϕ,−} hold.
Obviously, the monotonicity holds: if ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ and ψ ⇒ ψ′, then ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ′.
Example 6. Consider P0 in Example 2. Given precondition ϕ , we have ⊢ P0, 1, ϕ ◮
(∃t.ϕ) ∧ t = 0, denoted by ϕ1. Moreover, ⊢ P0, 5, ϕ ◮ (∃mv(b0).(∃s, v, t.ϕ1) ∧ t ≤
T ) ∧ (ua = 1 ∨ wa = 1) ∧ (ua = 0 ∧ wa = 0), the formula is un-satisfiable, thus
location 5 is not reachable. Other locations can be considered similarly. ⊓⊔
Implementation We have mechanized the whole framework in Isabelle/HOL and im-
plemented an interactive theorem prover for reasoning about hybrid systems modeled
using HCSP with binders 3.
5 Train Control Example
We apply our approach to the train control system depicted in Fig. 1: firstly, we construct
the formal model for the whole system, especially the train; secondly, prove for the train
that it is safe against denial-of-service security attack with respect to properties (F1) and
(F2); finally, explore the constraints that relate the constants of different components
and learn more precise behavior of the train. Assume for the train that its acceleration
ranges over [−c, c] for some c > 0, and the maximum speed is vmax.
Models The model of the train is given in Table 4. There are two auxiliary processes:
given a clock variable t and time T , MV (t, T) defines that the train moves with velocity
v and acceleration a for up to T time units; and SC defines the feedback control of
the train when the services from the driver or the VC fail: it performs an emergency
brake by setting a to be −c , and as soon as v is reduced to 0, resets a to be 0, thus
the train keeps still finally. The main process TR models the movement of a train. The
train first moves for at most T1 time units, during which it is always ready to send v to
the driver as well as the VC along trd and trv respectively. If neither of them responses
within T1, indicated by t1 ≥ T1, the self control is performed. Otherwise, if at least one
3 The prover, plus the models and proofs related to the train control example in next section, can
be found at https://github.com/wangslyl/hcspwithbinders.
TR = MV(t1, T1)☎ 0&∃(trd!v{uv}, trv!v{wv})7
→ (uv = 1 ∧ wv = 1 → (MV(t2, T2)☎&∃(dr?xa{ua}, vc?ya{wa}) →
(wa = 1 → (V A(v, ya) → a := ya;¬V A(v, ya) → SC);
ua = 1 ∧ wa = 0 → (V A(v, xa) → a := xa;¬V A(v, xa) → SC);
ua = 0 ∧ wa = 0 →
2skip); t2 ≥ T2 → SC;
uv = 1 ∧ wv = 0 → (MV(t2, T2)☎&∃(dr?xa{ua}) →
(ua = 1 → (V A(v, xa) → a := xa;¬V A(v, xa) → SC);
ua = 0→
3skip); t2 ≥ T2 → SC;
uv = 0 ∧ wv = 1 → (MV(t2, T2)☎&∃(vc?ya{wa}) →
(wa = 1 → (V A(v, ya) → a := ya;¬V A(v, ya) → SC);
wa = 0 →
4skip); t2 ≥ T2 → SC;
uv = 0 ∧ wv = 0 →
1skip); t1 ≥ T1 → SC;
MV (t, T) = t := 0; 〈s˙ = v, v˙ = a, t˙ = 1&t < T 〉
SC = a := −c; 〈s˙ = v, v˙ = a&v > 0〉; a := 0
Table 4. The model of train
communication occurs, the movement is interrupted and a sequence of case analysis is
followed to execute.
The first case, indicated by uv = 1 and wv = 1, represents that the driver as well
as the VC succeed to receive v. The train will wait for at most T2 time units for the
new acceleration from the driver or the VC along dr and vc respectively, and during the
waiting time, it continues to move with the original acceleration. The new acceleration
is expected to satisfy a safety condition V A(v, a):
(v > vmax − cT1 − cT2 ⇒ −c ≤ a < 0) ∧ (v < cT1 + cT2 ⇒ c ≥ a ≥ 0)
∧(cT1 + cT2 ≤ v ≤ vmax − cT1 − cT2)⇒ (−c ≤ a ≤ c)
which implies the boundaries for setting a to be positive or negative and is necessary
for keeping the velocity always in [0, vmax], otherwise, it will be rejected by the train. If
both the driver and the VC fail to response within T2, indicated by t2 ≥ T2, the self con-
trol is performed. Otherwise, the following case analysis is taken: If the train receives
a value (i.e. ya) from VC, indicated by wa = 1, then sets ya to be the acceleration if
it satisfies V A, otherwise, performs self control; if the train receives a value (i.e. xa)
from the driver but not from the VC, updates the acceleration similarly as above; if the
train receives no value from both (in fact never reachable), the skip is performed.
The other three cases, indicated by uv = 1 ∧ wv = 0, uv = 0 ∧ wv = 1, and
uv = 0 ∧wv = 0, can be considered similarly.
One possible implementation for driver and VC is given in Table 5, in which process
wait Ti for i = 3, 4 is an abbreviation for ti := 0; 〈t˙i = 1&ti < Ti〉. In process DR,
the driver asks the velocity of the train every T3 time units, and as soon as it receives
vd, indicated by uv = 1, it computes the new acceleration as follows: if vd is almost
reaching vmax (by the offset cT1 + cT2), then chooses a negative in [−c, 0) randomly;
if vd is almost reaching 0, then chooses a non-negative in [0, c] randomly; otherwise,
chooses one in [−c, c] randomly. The train then sends the value being chosen (i.e. da)
to the train, and if it fails to reach the train within T5 (i.e. the period of the clock), it
DR = wait T3; 5&∃trd?vd{uv}; 8uv = 1
→ (vd ≥ (vmax − cT1 − cT2)
→ 8l∈[−c,0)da := l;
vd < (cT1 + cT2) → 8l∈[0,c]da := l;
vd ∈ [cT1 + cT2, vmax − cT1 − cT2)
→ 8l∈[−c,c]da := l;
&∃(dr!da{ua}, tick?o{uc}) →
12(ua = 1 ∧ uc = 1 → skip;
ua = 1 ∧ uc = 0 → tick?o{uc};
ua = 0 ∧ uc = 1 → skip;
ua = 0 ∧ uc = 0 → skip)
‖CK);
uv = 0 → skip
CK = wait T5; tick!X
VC = wait T4; 6&∃trv?vr{wv}; 9wv = 1
→ (vr ≥ (vmax − cT1 − cT2)
→ ra := −c;
vr < (cT1 + cT2) → ra := c;
vr ∈ [cT1 + cT2, vmax − cT1 − cT2)
→ 8l∈[−c,c]ra := l;
&∃(vc!ra{wa}, tick?o{wc}) →
(wa = 1 ∧ wc = 1→ skip;
wa = 1 ∧ wc = 0 → tick?o{wc};
wa = 0 ∧ wc = 1 → skip;
wa = 0 ∧ wc = 0 → skip)
‖CK);
wv = 0 → skip
Table 5. The models of driver and VC
will give up. The auxiliary process clock is introduced to prevent deadlock caused by
the situation when the driver succeeds to receive velocity vd from the train but fails to
send acceleration da to the train within a reasonable time (i.e. T5 here). VC and DR
have very similar structure, except that VC has a different period T4, and it will choose
−c or c as the acceleration for the first two critical cases mentioned above.
Finally, the train control system can be modeled as the parallel composition: SYS =
TR∗‖DR∗‖VC∗‖CK∗. By using ∗, each component will be executed repeatedly.
Proofs of Train First of all, we define the precondition of TR∗, denoted by ϕ0, to be
V A(v, a)∧ 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax ∧−c ≤ a ≤ c, which indicates that in the initial state, v and
a satisfy the safety condition and are both well-defined.
Secondly, we need to calculate the differential invariants for differential equations
occurring in TR. Consider the equation in MV(t1, T1), the precondition of it with re-
spect to ϕ0, denoted by ϕ1, can be simply calculated, which is ϕ0 ∧ t1 = 0, then by
applying the method proposed in [9]:


(
0 ≤ t1 ≤ T1
)∧
(
a < 0⇒ (v ≥ cT2 + (at1 + cT1)) ∧ (v ≤ vmax)
)
∧ (
a ≥ 0⇒ (v ≤ vmax − cT2 + (at1 − cT1)) ∧ (v ≥ 0)
)


denoted by Inv1, constitutes a differential invariant of the continuous with respect to
ϕ1. It is a conjunction of three parts, indicating that: (1) t1 is always in the range [0, T1];
(2) if a is negative, v must be greater or equal than cT2 plus a positive value (i.e. at1 +
cT1), and meanwhile v ≤ vmax; and (3) if a is positive, v must be less or equal than
vmax − cT2 plus a negative value (i.e. at1− cT1), and meanwhile v ≥ 0. This invariant
is strong enough for guaranteeing cT2 ≤ v ≤ vmax − cT2 after the continuous escapes
no matter what a is in [−c, c]. Similarly, we can calculate the invariant of the continuous
occurring in MV(t2, T2), which is


(
0 ≤ t2 ≤ T2
)∧
(
a < 0⇒ (v ≥ 0 + (at2 + cT2)) ∧ (v ≤ vmax)
)
∧ (
a ≥ 0⇒ (v ≤ vmax + (at2 − cT2)) ∧ (v ≥ 0)
)


denoted by Inv2. This invariant is strong enough for guaranteeing 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax
after the continuous escapes. Finally, the invariant of the differential equation of SC is
0 ≤ v ≤ vmax, and we denote it by Inv3.
Next, to prove (F1) and (F2), we can prove the following facts instead:
– Locations 1, 2, 3, 4 are not reachable for TR∗;
– Throughout the execution of TR∗, the invariant 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax always holds.
First we consider one loop of execution TR. For location 1, we can deduce that 4
⊢ TR, 1, ϕ0 ◮ (uv ∨ wv) ∧ (¬uv ∧ ¬wv), which is not satisfiable, thus location 1
is never reachable. Similarly, we can deduce that locations 2, 3, 4 are not reachable
as well. Furthermore, by applying the inference system, we can deduce the specifica-
tion {ϕ0} TR {ϕ0, ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ vmax⌉<}. After one loop of execution of the train, ϕ0
still holds at termination. Thus, all the above reachability results obtained for TR still
hold for TR∗, whose execution is equivalent to some finite number of executions of
TR. Finally, plus that ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ vmax⌉< is idempotent over chop, we can deduce
{ϕ0} TR∗ {ϕ0, ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ vmax⌉<}, denoted by (TrainSpec), which implies that
0 ≤ v ≤ vmax is an invariant for the train.
By applying our interactive theorem prover, the fact (TrainSpec) is proved as a
theorem, and the above reachability results can be implied from the lemmas proved for
corresponding processes, according to the method introduced in Section 4.2.
We can see that, most of the proofs need to be performed in an interactive way,
mainly because of the following reasons: firstly, we need to provide the differential
invariants by ourselves during proof of continuous evolution; and secondly, we need
to conduct the proof of DC formulas by telling which axiom or inference rule of DC
should be applied. For the first problem, we will consider the integration of the prover to
a differential invariant generator that can be implemented based on the method proposed
in [9]. For the second, we will consider the decidability of DC and design algorithms
for solving the decidable subsets, or as an alternative approach, consider translating DC
formulas into HOL formulas in a semantic way and applying the existing automatic
solvers for HOL instead. Both of these will be our future work.
Constraints of Constants We can further analyze the behavior of the whole system
SYS. By defining the constraints relating different constants, the behavior of commu-
nications between the three components can be determined. Consider the first loop of
execution of each component, based on reachability analysis, we have the following
facts: for locations 0, 5, 6, t1 = 0, t3 = T3 and t4 = T4 hold respectively, and for
locations 7, 8, 9, t1 ≤ T1, t3 ≥ T3 and t4 ≥ T4 hold respectively. The synchroniza-
tion points have four possibilities: (7, 8), (7, 9), (7, 8, 9), or none. For the first case, i.e.
4 For simplicity, we use the boldface of an acknowledgment variable to represent the corre-
sponding formula, e.g., uv for uv = 1.
the train succeeds to communicate with the driver but not with the VC, there must be
t1 = t3 < t4, and if T3 < T4 and T3 ≤ T1 hold, this case will occur. The second
one is exactly the contrary case. For the third case, there must be t1 = t3 = t4, and if
T3 = T4 ≤ T1 holds, this case will occur. Finally, if both T3 > T1 and T4 > T1 hold,
the last case occurs, i.e., locations 7, 8 and 9 are not reachable, and thus the train fails to
communicate with both the driver and the VC. Following this approach, more precise
behavior of the communications of the train can be obtained.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a formal modeling language, that is a combination of hybrid CSP
and binders from quality calculus, for expressing denial-of-service due to unreliable
communications in hybrid systems. With the linguistic support, it is able to build a safe
hybrid system that behaves in a reasonable manner in the presence of denial-of-service
security attack. The idea is that, when the service from the controllers fails, the physical
system itself needs to provide feedback control, in order to meet the safety require-
ments. The paper also develops an inference system for reasoning about such systems,
with no dependence on the behavior of the environment, and furthermore implements
an interactive theorem prover. We illustrate our approach by considering an example
taken from train control system.
The investigation of our approach to more complex hybrid systems is one of our fu-
ture work. Meanwhile, for facilitating practical applications, we will consider to achieve
more support of automated reasoning in the theorem prover.
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